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Abstract 
Financial dollarization in Sub-Saharan Africa is the most persistent compared to other regions 
of the world. This study complements the existing scant literature on dollarization in Africa 
by assessing the role of information sharing offices (public credit registries and private credit 
bureaus) on financial dollarization in 26 countries of SSA for the period 2001-2012. The 
empirical evidence is based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM). The findings show that information sharing offices (which are designed to 
reduce information asymmetry) in the banking industry are a deterrent to dollarization.  Policy 
implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
The motivation for investigating the effect of reducing information asymmetry on financial 
dollarization in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is threefold, notably: dollarization as a policy 
syndrome; the uniqueness of SSA and gaps in the literature.  
 First, financial dollarization
1
 is a policy syndrome for a multitude of reasons. In 
particular, dollarization can represent a substantial challenge to policy makers because it, inter 
alia: restricts liquidity management; constraints the capacity of monetary authorities to lend in 
last resort and drives financial sector instability because it could increase the effect of 
exchange rate variations on the balance sheet of financial institutions, thereby boosting the 
incidence of bank failures and economic contractions. Accordingly, the implementation of 
                                                          
1
Dollarization is a characteristic of financial development under macroeconomic instability which entails the use 
of foreign currencies as a unit of account, store of value and medium of exchange.  
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economic policies can be complicated by dollarization through a multitude of mechanisms, 
namely: (i) the exposure of balance sheets (of households, the public sector and private 
corporations) to exchange rate risks in situations of mismatch in assets and liabilities that are 
denominated in foreign currency; (ii) reduction of the capacity of authorities to employ 
monetary policy, especially the central bank’s ability to stabilize the financial system as a 
lender of last resort; (iii) slackening structural fiscal flexibility and fiscal balance by reducing 
opportunities of seigniorage and (iv) diminishing the capabilities of governments to issue 
debts in the domestic currency for the medium and long terms, which would further increase 
vulnerabilities to shocks and hence accelerate economic fluctuations (IMF, 2015).  It is 
important to balance the above narrative with the position that dollarization is also appealing 
in specific circumstances. For instance, economies with chaotic inflation which permit 
deposits in foreign currency discourage residence from depositing abroad, there-by 
encouraging transactions through the domestic banking system.  
 Second, compared to other regions in the world, dollarization is most persistent in 
SSA
2
. In essence, dollarization is prominently in SSA where it represents over 30% of bank 
loans and deposits. Accordingly, the uniqueness of SSA draws from the fact that since 
independence the sub-region has experienced tumultuous development. The policy syndromes 
have included; political instability (which is hedged by macroeconomic players through 
dollarization); limited financial deepening (with overly reliance on the financial intermediary 
sector vis-à-vis stock markets which naturally invites more hedging) and low development of 
the private sector (which is reflected in low demand for local currency). It is important to note 
that such syndromes contributed to the poor post-independence growth of Africa. Fosu (2013) 
has defined ‘policy syndromes’ as characteristics that are detrimental to development, 
namely: ‘state breakdown’, ‘administered redistribution’, ‘state controls’ and ‘suboptimal 
inter temporal resource allocation’. Owing to the above politico-economic shortcomings, 
many countries in SSA experienced short economic booms that were characterised by 
frequent reversals owing to external shock like adverse variations to terms of trade and 
political unrests/civil conflicts that hindered economic take-offs. Moreover, with limited 
monetization, a small private export sector, appropriate restrictions to foreign exchange and 
substantial informal economic sectors, foreign exchanges took hold, principally in the form of 
capital flight.  
                                                          
2
 According to the IMF (2015), dollarization is most persistent in SSA.  This claim is confirmed in our data 
because the correlation between the financial dollarization index and its first lagged value is greater than the rule 
thumb of threshold of 0.800 needed to ascertain persistent a given variable.  
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 Third, both the ‘information asymmetry’- and ‘dollarization’- specific literatures have 
failed to engage the relationship between reducing information asymmetry and financial 
dollarization. On the one hand, studies on information asymmetry have fundamentally 
focused on financial access (see Galindo & Miller, 2001; Love & Mylenko, 2003; Barth et al., 
2009; Singh et al., 2009; Asongu et al., 2016ab; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2016). On the other 
hand, studies on dollarization have either been country-specific (see Kessy, 2011) or panel-
based with a focus on determinants of dollarization (Olalekan, 2009; Raheem & Asongu, 
2016; IMF, 2015). 
 This study complements existing literature by assessing the role of reducing 
information asymmetry on dollarization in SSA. Understanding the role of information 
sharing offices (e.g. public credit registries and private credit bureaus) in influencing 
dollarization in SSA could better inform policy makers on potential vulnerabilities and risks 
associated with the excessive use of foreign currency.  It is relevant to articulate the link 
between information sharing offices and financial crises which is a determinant of 
dollarization. In essence, policy syndromes as discussed above are associated with high rates 
of dollarization which are fundamentally caused by crises, such as: capital flight, withdrawal 
of banking savings and growth of the informal sector. Information sharing offices are 
theoretically designed to mitigate these characteristics that portray a negative investment 
climate. Moreover, after the 2008 global financial crises, more information sharing offices 
were introduced across the sub region (see Tchamyou & Asongu, 2016) and the impact of 
globalisation and negative consequences of macroeconomic instability invite an inquiry on 
how reducing information asymmetry can affect dollarization. In a nutshell, the use of foreign 
currencies in an economy could be due to low access of domestic currency to finance 
investments because of information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers in the banking 
industry. Information sharing offices are theoretically designed to limit such information 
asymmetry, notably: the adverse selection of banks, ex-ante of the lending process and the 
moral hazard of borrowers, ex-post of the lending process.  
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the stylized facts, 
theoretical underpinnings and related literature. The data and methodology are covered in 
Section 3 while Section 4 presents the empirical results. We conclude in Section 5 with 
implications and future research directions.  
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2. Stylized facts, theoretical underpinnings and related literature  
2. 1 Stylized facts  
In this section on the stylized facts, we engage the progress of financial dollarization and 
access to foreign exchange in SSA (Raheem & Asongu, 2016). This background information 
is engaged in two strands, namely: (i) statistics on financial dollarization from country-
specific, global and regional cases and (ii) an overview of various foreign exchange sources.  
 As shown in Table 1, it can be observed that both the ratio of foreign currency in bank 
deposits (deposit dollarization) and the ratio of foreign currency in bank loans (loan 
dollarization) are highest in SSA. A reason for the leading role of SSA is dollarization in the 
world could be traceable to lack of financial access, which may be due to excess liquidity in 
financial institutions owing to information asymmetry or an overall lack of capital to finance 
long term investment
3
. Accordingly, the resulting finance gap is very likely to be financed 
with foreign currency.  The second group of countries with the highest rate of dollarization is 
in Latin America. The high rate of dollarization in this sub-region can be traceable to some 
countries that have given-up their domestic currencies for the USD, namely: Peru, Ecuador, 
El-Salvador, Bolivia and Argentina. Moreover, it is important to note that Latin America was 
the first region to adopt a dollarization policy to hedge against macroeconomic 
disequilibriums. Third in the rankings is the ‘East & South Asia and the Pacific’ region which 
is substantially dominated by China and India because of their comparatively higher levels of 
foreign direct investments in the region.   
 
Table 1:  Global trends of Financial Dollarization 
Regions Deposit dollarization  Loan dollarization 
SSA 29.6 30.5 
Latin America and Caribbean 28.2 25.1 
East & South Asia and the Pacific 19.5 18.95 
Middle East and North Africa 15.6 12.3 
Average 29.1 27 
Authors’ computation with underlying data from IFS and IMF (2015) 
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 The narrative is consistent with recent African business literature (Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Darley, 
2012). 
6 
 
Figure 1: Pictorial Analysis of Dollarization in SSA 
 
Source: IMF (2015) 
 A pictorial perspective of dollarization in SSA is shown in Figure 1 which is presented 
in two-sub diagrams: one for the year 2001 and other for the year 2012.  Table 2 presents a 
tabular trend of dollarization in four sub-categories, namely:  2001-2004; 2005-2008; 2009-
2012 and 2001-2012.  It is apparent from the table that the three most dollarized countries in 
SSA are Angola, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (also see Raheem  & 
Asongu, 2016). According to the IMF (2015), the following countries can equally be 
acknowledged as highly dollarized, namely: Ghana, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Sierra Leone. In line with the same narrative, moderately dollarized countries are Malawi, 
Kenya, Eritrea and Uganda. The remaining nations fall under the category of low dollarized 
economies. Note should be taken of the fact that during the period 2009-2012, SSA 
experienced a decline in the use of foreign currency, with the exceptions of Kenya, Djibouti, 
Sierra Leone and the DRC.  The only significant event which occurred between 2007/2008 
that could elucidate this average dwindle in the use of foreign currency in the sub-region is 
the 2007/2008 global financial crisis.   
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Table 2: Country-Specific Background of Financial Dollarization in SSA 
Countries 2001-2004 2005-2008 2009-2012 2001-2012 
Angola 76.67 66 55.5 66.06 
Botswana 23.15 17.14 25.92 22.07 
Burundi 7.5 12.63 14.56 11.56 
Cape Verde 6.2 6.74 6.43 6.46 
Comoros 2.23 1 1 1.41 
Congo, DR 80.23 84.73 85.27 83.41 
Djibouti 58.45 54.73 57.13 56.77 
Eritrea 18.38 18.98 15.99 17.78 
Ghana 30.58 29.26 28.5 29.45 
Guinea 25.17 30.22 21.45 25.61 
Kenya 15.87 15.03 16.24 15.71 
Liberia 76.8 83.03 82.6 80.81 
Malawi 19.52 17.88 16.52 17.97 
Mauritius 14.98 19.92 15.34 16.75 
Mozambique 49.5 42.25 34.75 42.17 
Namibia 1.73 1.21 0.84 1.26 
Nigeria 8.94 10.32 13.83 11.03 
Rwanda 30.01 24.03 22.13 25.39 
Sao Tome 48.66 60.42 56.5 55.19 
Seychelles 4.34 15.73 27.76 15.94 
Sierra Leone 27.35 30.01 34.87 30.74 
South Africa 1.45 1.25 1 1.23 
Tanzania 40.5 38.25 34.51 37.75 
Uganda 30.87 26.18 26.45 27.83 
Zambia 49.37 41.26 38.25 42.96 
Source: Authors’ Computation 
A principal driver of dollarization is the mismatch in macroeconomic fundamentals. Some of 
these macroeconomic fundamentals include: interest rates, inflation and exchange rate 
volatility. In the light of the three most dollarized economies in SSA identified above, 
statistics show comparatively high inflation rates in the corresponding countries (see Raheem 
& Asongu, 2016). For example between 2001 and 2012, the average inflation rate for Congo 
and Angola were respectively 42% and 43%. Moreover, the DRC and Angola experienced 
inflation rates of 247% and 21% respectively.  The relevance of macroeconomic stability in 
less dollarization is confirmed when the analysis is extended to the low dollarized economies 
in the sample.  
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2. 2 Theoretical underpinnings and related literature  
2.2.1 Theoretical highlights  
 Two dominant theoretical narratives exist on the relationship between information 
sharing and financial development which for the most part reflect the use of domestic 
currency (see Claus & Grimes, 2003; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2016). While the first is 
concerned with the transformation of risk characteristics in bank assets, the second is oriented 
toward channels via which liquidity from banks can be consolidated. Moreover, the two 
theoretical perspectives are consistent with view that the principal mission of financial 
institutions is to boost intermediation efficiency by channelling mobilised deposits from 
lenders into credit for investment purposes. 
In the light of the above theoretical insights, the connection between information 
sharing offices and dollarization is apparent because the use of foreign currency in an 
economy could be due to low access in domestic currency needed to finance investments 
owing to information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. This is essentially because 
information sharing offices are theoretically designed to limit such information asymmetry, 
notably: the adverse selection of banks, ex-ante of the lending process and the moral hazard of 
borrowers, ex-post of the lending process. Moreover, given that crises and macroeconomic 
instability are determinants of dollarization, it is important to note that the policy syndromes 
engaged in the introduction are linked to higher rates of dollarization which are fundamentally 
caused by crises which result in inter alia: withdrawal of banking savings, growth of the 
informal sector and capital flight.  
We have also observed from the stylized facts that the use of dollarization on average 
in SSA decreased in a periodic interval (2009-2012) during which the recent global financial 
crises occurred. Coincidentally, the sub-region also experienced an upsurge in the 
establishment of information sharing offices across the continent during the same époque. The 
perspective that more information sharing offices were instituted across Africa during the 
financial crises is aptly documented by Mylenko (2008). According to the author, prior to 
2008, public credit registries and private credit bureaus were predominantly in a few countries 
in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the emerging 
economies of Latin America and Asia. In SSA for instance, prior to the crisis, with the 
exception of South Africa, very few African countries had well functioning credit reporting 
bureaus. Some countries (e.g. Mozambique, Rwanda and Nigeria) had instituted credit 
bureaus with the primary objective of boosting banking sector supervision. It is important to 
note that because of the absence of good technology and adequate incentives, most credit 
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registries did not report timely and accurate information. Accordingly, some years before 
2008, a number of initiatives were undertaken across Africa at the request of information by 
supervisory bodies, with the prime purpose of instituting information sharing offices. 
Financial supervisors needed the information or data to consolidate risk management practices 
on the one hand and banking institutions on the other hand. Some of the countries that 
initiated credit information offices are: Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. 
 
2.2.2. Information asymmetry, dollarization and financial development  
This section is discussed in three main strands, notably: (i) the relationship between 
information asymmetry and financial development; (ii) the linkage between dollarization and 
financial development and (iii) determinants of dollarization. First, on the nexus between 
information asymmetry and financial development, in accordance with recent African 
literature on information sharing (see Asongu et al., 2016a), empirical inquires on the 
phenomenon have for the most part focused on two principal axes, namely: the effects of 
information sharing among creditors on the one hand and the incidence of creditors’ rights on 
enhanced channels of information sharing on the other hand. According to the narrative, one 
strand of the literature is focused on the importance of stronger creditors’ rights in: banks’ 
ability to take more risks (Houston et al., 2010; Acharya et al., 2011) and bankruptcy 
(Claessens & Klapper, 2005; Djankov et al., 2007; Brockman & Unlu, 2009). The other strand 
is oriented toward assessing how information sharing could inter alia: consolidate access to 
finance (Djankov et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014); reduce default rates 
(Jappelli & Pagano, 2002 ); affect syndicated bank loans (Tanjung et al., 2010; Ivashina, 2009 
); diminish credit costs (Brown et al., 2009 ); impact lending that is influenced by corruption 
(Barth et al., 2009 ) and influence antitrust intervention (Coccorese, 2012).  
 Apparently, the engaged literature for the most part has been oriented toward the 
emerging economies outside Africa and developed nations where issues of excess liquidity in 
financial institutions are not so serious. Accordingly, whereas most studies have focused on 
the developing economies of Latin America and Asia on the one hand and countries of  the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development on the other hand, not much 
scholarship has been devoted to the African continent which paradoxically is experiencing the 
most severe financial access constraints, owing information asymmetry (Asongu et al., 
2016b). Moreover, the scant literature on the relationship between information asymmetry and 
financial development has not focused on financial dollarization but been limited to financial 
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access (see Love & Mylenko, 2000; Galindo &Miller, 2001; Barth et al., 2009; Triki & 
Gajigo, 2014).  
 Second, there is a plethora of ways via which the financial sector is connected to 
dollarization.   A notable connection is the misallocation impact: a tendency in which 
financial institutions could want to hedge against risks and hence, match assets to liabilities. 
In the same vein, the level of financial sector development depends on the ability of the sector 
to absorb exogenous shocks that originate from increasing activities that are ‘foreign 
currency’-related (De Nicolo et al., 2003; Levy-Yeyati, 2006). Honohan and Shi (2002) have 
shown that high dollarization levels increase the deepening of the financial sector: findings 
that have been confirmed by De Nicolo et al. (2003) within the framework of inflationary 
economies. There is a positive link between private credit and loan dollarization (Asel, 2010). 
Moreover, financial development has an inverse relationship with the level of dollarization. 
This confirms the intuition for this study, notably: information sharing offices which are 
destined to promote domestic financial development should decrease financial dollarization.  
Third, on the determinants of dollarization, with the exceptions of Olalekan (2009), 
Raheem and Asongu (2016) and the IMF (2015) inquires have failed to engage  the concern 
of dollarization within the context of Africa. Olalekan (2009) has investigated the impact of 
macroeconomic variations on deposit dollarization in eighteen countries in SSA for the period 
1980 to 2004 in order to articulate how deposit dollarization is explained by capital account 
restrictions and variations in exchange rate expectations. Kessy (2011) has argued that the 
most apparent impact from the liberalization of the financial sector in Tanzania has been an 
upsurge in the use of the US Dollar as a legal tender by residents. According to the IMF 
(2015), compared to the rest of the world, dollarization has been most persistent in SSA, with 
very few episodes of de-dollarization.  Moreover, of the five most dollarized countries (São 
Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, the DRC, Liberia and Zambia), with the exception of Angola, the 
remaining countries have not experienced a downward trend in loan and deposit dollarization. 
In contrast, an upward tendency has been recorded over the past decade in SãoTomé and 
Príncipe, Liberia and the DRC. Raheem and Asongu (2016) have extended the literature on 
the determinants of dollarization in SSA for the period 2001-2012 by assessing the role 
played by three sources of foreign currency earnings, namely: trade openness, financial 
integration and natural resource rent. The results show that with the exception of natural 
resource rent, the other two variables are significant drivers of dollarization. More 
specifically, it is established that financial liberalization and trade openness are positive 
drivers of dollarization whereas natural resource rents have the opposite effects.  
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3. Data and methodology  
3.1 Data  
 This study investigates a panel of 26 countries in SSA for the period 2001-2012 with 
data from World Governance Indicators (WGI) and the International Financial Statistics of 
the IMF. The choice of the sample and periodicity are based on data availability constraints 
while the focus on SSA is consistent with the motivation of the study. 
 The dependent variable is the financial dollarization index whereas information 
sharing offices which are the independent variables of interest are proxied with public credit 
registries and private credit bureaus. Both the choice of the dependent and independent 
variables are consistent with recent dollarization (see Raheem & Asongu, 2016) and 
information asymmetry (Triki& Gajigo, 2014) literature.  
 Consistent with the engaged literature, five main control variables are adopted, 
namely: inflation, exchange rate volatility, institutions, financial development and economic 
prosperity in term of GDP per capita growth.  We discuss the expected signs chronologically. 
First, inflation has been established to positively affect dollarization (see Ize & Levy-Yeyati, 
2003; De-Nicole, 2005; Yinusa, 2009; Vieri et al., 2012). The intuition for the expected sign 
builds on the fact that the value of money decreases with inflation owing to diminishing 
purchasing power. Moreover, higher inflation levels motivate reallocation of assets within a 
portfolio in order to hedge risks associated with the denominated currency under inflation, 
notably: by selling assets denominated in domestic currency and buying assets in foreign 
currency. This is broadly consistent with Canzoneri and Diba (1992) on the position that 
dollarization should be a stabilizing instrument in periods of high inflation.   
 Second, exchange rate volatility is also anticipated to increase financial dollarization 
because investors are less likely to hold domestic currency if it suffers from high exchange 
rate fluctuations. The narrative is consistent with both non-contemporary (Arango & Nadiri, 
1981) and contemporary literature in the perspective that investors have been documented to 
prefer engaging with economic environments that are less ambiguous (Kelsey & le Roux, 
2016; Le Roux & Kelsey, 2016).  
 Third, from intuition, the quality of institutions should have a negative effect on 
dollarization because it reassures investors of the credibility of government policies, 
especially those related to the enforcement of contracts and assurance of objectivity of 
monetary authorities. This intuition is in accordance with the dollarization literature (see Ize 
& Parrado, 2002; Aizenman et al., 2005 ; De Nicolo et al., 2005 ;  Honig, 2005, 2009 ; Levy-
Yeyati, 2006;  Doblas-Madrid, 2009). 
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 Fourth, financial development is a deterrent to dollarization. This anticipation which is 
consistent with Raheem and Asongu (2016) has been justified by the IMF (2015) with the 
argument that innovations in financial sector commodities would boost investments in 
domestic currency.  
Fifth, GDP per capita growth is expected to reduce financial dollarization (see Yinusa, 
2009; IMF, 2015). As argued by Yinusa (2009), an economy that is growing and active with a 
strong base of production is supported by domestic currency. However, this expected sign 
should be treated with caution because if the fruits of economic prosperity are not evenly 
distribution, dollarization may increase because compared to citizens in the low income strata, 
the elite is more likely to engage with projects/investments that require foreign currency. This 
may be the case in SSA because over the past decade, poverty has been increasing the sub-
region in spite of its growth resurgence (Asongu et al., 2015).  Table 1 presents the data and 
the corresponding summary statistics whereas the correlation matrix is disclosed in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Table 3: Definition of variables and Summary statistics 
         
 Definitions Source Mean S.D Min Max Obs 
         
Inflation Inflation rate (Consumer Price Index, % of annual) WDI 12.490 25.542 -2.404 359.936 264 
        
Exchange rate Exchange rate volatility (Standard deviation of nominal exchange 
rate) 
WDI 305.164 817.215 0.343 3843.128 275 
        
Institutions  Institutional index (average values of CC, GE, RQ, VA, RL and 
PS) 
WGI 0.002 1.484 -2.970 3.617 275 
        
Finance  Private sector credit (Private sector credit, % of GDP) WDI 23.996 28.811 0.198 160.124 269 
        
GDP per capita GDP per capita growth rate (% of annual) WDI 2.923 4.865 -33.746 29.392 272 
        
Public registries  Public credit registries coverage (% of adults) WDI 1.756 6.898 0.000 49.800 186 
        
Private bureaus  Private credit bureaus coverage (% of adults) WDI 7.001 17.895 0.000 64.800 184 
        
Dollarization  Financial Dollarization index IFS 29.620 23.618 0.400 90 275 
         
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  WDI : World Development Indicators  WGI : World Governance Index   IFS: International Financial Statistics   
GE : Government Effectiveness, RQ : Regulatory Quality  CC : Control of Corruption  VA: Voice and Accountability PS Political Stability and Lack of Violence and RL : Rule of Law 
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Table 4: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 168) 
         
Inflation  Sexch Instidex Findev GDPpcg PCR PCB FinDol  
1.000 0.367 -0.250 -0.293 -0.041 -0.192 -0.224 0.331 Inflation 
 1.000 -0.246 -0.088 -0.088 -0.104 -0.165 0.243 Sexch 
  1.000 0.530 0.001 0.263 0.609 -0.420 Instidex 
   1.000 -0.071 0.312 0.635 -0.454 Findev 
    1.000 0.083 -0.109 0.287 GDPpcg 
     1.000 -0.110 -0.149 PCR 
      1.000 -0.381 PCB 
       1.000 FinDol 
         
Sexch: Exchange rate volatility. Instidex: Institutional index. Findev: private sector credit. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. FinDol: 
Financial Dollarisation Index. PCR: public credit registries. PCB: private credit bureaus.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Baseline specification 
The Ordinary Least Squares specification is as follows in Eq. (1) 
tiih
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j
j
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5
1
,2,10,   

     (1), 
where: tiFD ,  is the financial dollarization  of country i  at  period t ; is a constant; PCR , 
Public Credit Registries; PCB , Private Credit Bureaus; W  is the vector of five control 
variables  (inflation, exchange rate volatility, institutional index, private sector credit   and 
GDP per capita growth), and ti ,  the error term. The specification is robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors. 
 
 
3.2.2Robustness Specification  
 The study adopts the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with forward 
orthogonal deviations as empirical strategy for robustness checks. The specification is the 
Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) which has been documented to 
limit instrument proliferation and control for cross sectional dependence (see Love &  
Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008). The two primary conditions for the implementation of the 
GMM technique are satisfied. On the one hand, the financial dollarization dependent variable 
is persistent, given that the correlation between financial dollarization and its first lag is above 
of the 0.800 threshold required to ascertain persistence, specifically it is 0.979. Moreover, 
consistent with the IMF (2015), financial dollarization in SSA is very persistent. On the other 
hand, the number of time series (T=12) is less than the number of cross sections (N=26). 
Hence, N>T.  It is important to note that there is some bite on endogeneity because: (i) time-
invariant variables or years are used to control for the unobserved heterogeneity and (ii) the 
instrumentation process accounts for simultaneity.  
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The following equations in levels (2) and first difference (3) summarize the standard 
GMM estimation procedure.  
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where: tiFD ,  is the financial dollarization of country i at  period t ; is a constant; represents 
the coefficient of autoregression;  PCR , Public Credit Registries; PCB , Private Credit 
Bureaus; W  is the vector of five control variables  (inflation, exchange rate volatility, 
institutional index, private sector credit   and GDP per capita growth), i  
is the country-
specific effect, t is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. In the specification, a 
two-step instead of a one-step procedure is adopted because it controls for heteroscedasticity. 
 
3.2.3 Identification and exclusion restrictions  
 
 Consistent with recent literature (Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016a), all independent indicators are predetermined or suspected endogenous 
variables. Therefore, whereas the gmmstyle is adopted for the predetermined variables, only 
years are treated as strictly exogenous and the method for treating the ivstyle (years) is 
‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ because it is highly unfeasible for the years to become endogenous in 
first-difference (see Roodman, 2009b). 
 To tackle the issue of simultaneity, lagged regressors are employed as instruments for 
forward-differenced variables. Accordingly, in order to purge fixed effects that are susceptible 
of influencing the investigated nexuses, Helmet transformations are performed for the 
regressors (see Asongu & De Moor, 2016). These transformations entail forward mean-
differencing of the variables: the mean of future observations is deducted from the variables 
instead of subtracting the previous observations for the contemporaneous one (Roodman, 
2009b, p. 104). These transformations enable parallel or orthogonal conditions between 
forward-differenced variables and lagged values. Regardless of the number of lags, in order to 
minimise the loss of data, with the exception of the last observation for each country, the 
underlying transformations are computable for all observations. “And because lagged 
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observations do not enter the formula, they are valid as instruments” (Roodman (2009b, p. 
104). 
 The study further argues that the time invariant variables that are treated as strictly 
exogenous, influence financial dollarization exclusively through the endogenous explaining 
variables. The statistical relevance underlying this exclusion restriction is assessed with the 
Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity.  Accordingly, the alternative 
hypothesis of the test should be rejected for the instruments to explain financial dollarization 
exclusively via the endogenous explaining variables. Note should be taken of the fact that, in 
the standard instrumental variable procedure, rejecting the alternative hypothesis of the 
Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test shows that the instruments elucidate  financial 
dollarization exclusively via the investigated mechanisms or suspected endogenous variables. 
Whereas this information criterion has been employed in the literature using an instrumental 
variable estimation technique (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b), in the 
GMM  procedure (with forward orthogonal deviations) the DHT is employed to investigate 
whether time invariant variables exhibit strict exogeneity by explaining financial dollarization 
exclusively via the proposed channels (or endogenous explaining variables). Therefore, in the 
reported findings, we confirm the validity of the exclusion restriction test when the alternative 
hypothesis of DHT related to instrumental variables (year, eq(diff)) is rejected.  
 
4. Empirical results  
Table 5 and Table 6 below present the empirical findings. Whereas Table 5 shows baseline 
findings from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the GMM results are disclosed in Table 6. The 
following findings can be established from the baseline results. Private credit bureaus 
decrease financial dollarization whereas the effect from public credit registries is not 
significant. Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. The unexpected 
negative effect from GDP per capita growth may be traceable to the fact the fruits of 
economic prosperity are not evenly distributed across the sub-region. Hence, the elite which 
enjoys more of the wealth from economic growth is more associated with activities that are 
linked to foreign currency compared to domestic currency which is more averagely used by 
the majority of the population.  This explanation is consistent with a recent World Bank report 
on attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) poverty targets which has 
revealed that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of world with the exception 
of SSA (see Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c), despite the sub-region enjoying more than two 
decades of growth resurgence that began in the mid 1990s (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d).  
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In Table 6, four post-estimation diagnostic tests are used to assess the validity of 
models
4
. Based on the underlying criteria, all the five specifications are valid. The following 
findings are can be established. Both public credit registries and private credit bureaus 
decrease financial dollarization. The significant control variables display the expected signs.   
 
Table 5: Baseline Ordinary Least Squares  
      
 Dependent Variable: Financial Dollarization Index 
      
Constant  25.285*** 25.505*** 16.820*** 22.592*** 21.063*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries  -0.220 -0.222 -0.240 -0.148 0.058 
 (0.152) (0.143) (0.160) (0.307) (0.748) 
Private Credit Bureaus  -0.245*** -0.248*** -0.184*** -0.136* 0.024 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.073) (0.813) 
Inflation  0.679*** 0.590** 0.656*** 0.555** 0.553** 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.003) (0.014) (0.014) 
Exchange rate volatility  --- 0.002 0.003** 0.004*** 0.003** 
  (0.162) (0.047) (0.004) (0.023) 
Institution  -3.720*** -3.496** -3.610** --- -3.365** 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.010)  (0.015) 
GDP per capita growth --- --- 1.981*** 1.954*** 2.007*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial Development  --- --- --- -0.211*** -0.203*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Adjusted R² 0.249 0.254 0.336 0.353 0.377 
Fisher 23.82*** 21.50*** 18.68*** 27.16*** 25.62*** 
Observations  176 176 174 168 168 
      
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4“First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for 
the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen 
overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the 
positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test 
is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order 
to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower 
than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for 
exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a 
Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2016, p.9). 
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Table 6: Generalised Method of Moments  
      
 Dependent Variable: Financial Dollarization Index 
      
Constant  0.594 12.188*** 9.841** 7.737** 8.491** 
 (0.579) (0.000) (0.026) (0.034) (0.020) 
Financial Dollarization (-1) 0.910*** 0.634*** 0.719*** 0.771*** 0.782*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries  -0.119*** -0.205* -0.123 -0.140* -0.066 
 (0.000) (0.067) (0.216) (0.066) (0.464) 
Private Credit Bureaus  -0.097*** -0.059 -0.071 -0.085* 0.006 
 (0.000) (0.207) (0.142) (0.053) (0.921) 
Inflation  0.136** 0.173*** 0.128* 0.146** 0.034 
 (0.020) (0.003) (0.070) (0.031) (0.582) 
Exchange rate volatility  --- -0.015*** -0.008** -0.003** -0.004* 
  (0.000) (0.013) (0.039) (0.087) 
Institution  0.581 -2.176** -1.947** --- --- 
 (0.124) (0.012) (0.020)   
GDP per capita growth --- --- -0.115 0.018 0.037 
   (0.369) (0.867) (0.818) 
Financial Development  --- --- --- -0.014 0.015 
    (0.747) (0.755) 
      
      
AR(1) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
AR(2) (0.130) (0.105) (0.163) (0.135) (0.122) 
Sargan OIR (0.006) (0.246) (0.170) (0.092) (0.020) 
Hansen OIR (0.304) (0.562) (0.649) (0.953) (0.939) 
 
     
DHT for instruments      
(a)Instruments in levels      
H excluding group (0.631) (0.719) (0.366) (0.499) (0.568) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.188) (0.393 (0.713) (0.982) (0.957) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff))      
H excluding group (0.250) (0.210) (0.825) (0.644) (0.672) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.407) (0.932) (0.288) (1.000) (0.998) 
Fisher  1793.87*** 163.99*** 249.75*** 3296.32*** 2321.82*** 
Instruments  26 30 33 34 38 
Countries  24 24 24 24 24 
Observations  176 176 174 168 168 
      
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for 
Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) 
The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the 
AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR and DHT  tests. 
 
 
5. Concluding implications and future research directions  
 
Financial dollarization in Sub-Saharan Africa is the most persistent compared to other regions 
of the world. This study has complemented the existing scant literature on dollarization in 
Africa by assessing the role of information sharing offices (public credit registries and private 
credit bureaus) on financial dollarization in 26 countries of SSA for the period 2001-2012. 
The empirical evidence is based on Ordinary Least Squares and Generalised Method of 
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Moments (GMM). The findings show that information sharing offices (which are designed to 
reduce information asymmetry) in the banking industry are a deterrent to dollarization.  
 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to have empirically shown that the 
de-dollarization process can be facilitated with information sharing offices. Hence, 
information sharing offices can complement a plethora of macroeconomic policies that have 
been established to curb dollarization, inter alia: market-based incentives, sound 
macroeconomic policies and micro-prudential measures. In order to sustain efforts toward 
economic stabilization, the role of information sharing offices in reducing dollarization can be 
enhanced if such credit bureaus are designed to: (i) restore macroeconomic stability (e.g. 
reducing inflation and ensuring the sustainability fiscal policy)  by informing/convincing both 
lenders and borrowers that they can be confident in the value of domestic currency; (ii) 
consolidate the prudential framework (which provides incentives to hold deposits in domestic 
currency) in order to mitigate risks associated with currency mismatches; (iii) pursue market-
based as opposed to administrative procedures targeting de-dollarization, essentially because 
information sharing offices are closer to the market compared to authorities who may engage 
authoritative de-dollarization initiatives that have proven not to work effectively (see IMF, 
2015) and (iv) inform market participants on avenues of adequate rates of return for 
investments in domestic currency in the medium- and long-terms. For more targeted policy 
implications, future research can focus on assessing if established linkages further withstand 
empirical scrutiny within country-specific settings.  
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